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Philosophies of Digital Pedagogy 
A Special Issue of: Studies in Philosophy and Education 
Editors: David Lewin (University of Strathclyde) & David Lundie (Liverpool Hope University) 
 
This special issue draws attention to an emerging field of study, combining the philosophy of 
technology and information theory, with critical pedagogy and educational philosophy. It builds 
upon a conference sponsored by the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain: Humanising 
Online Pedagogy hosted by Liverpool Hope University (Liverpool, UK) in May 2014. The conference 
brought together educational practitioners and philosophers to explore the pedagogical, epistemic, 
social, and philosophical implications of technological change for educators. Papers included 
perspectives from adult education, learning disabilities, information theory, and global perspectives 
on the ethics of technology. As well as including versions of some papers presented here, the special 
issue also includes invited contributions from authors across the philosophy of educational 
technology debate. This issue also features an interview with Bernard Stiegler, a leading figure in 
contemporary philosophy of technology, whose recent work locates him directly among debates 
within educational theory and practice. The debates developed in this issue demonstrate the on-
going significance of philosophy and educational theory to practical, eveŶ ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚůǇ  ‘ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ?
issues, calling to mind long-standing concerns raised by figures such as Jacques Ellul, Martin 
Heidegger, Herbert Marcuse and other so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂů ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ŽĨ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ?  ?ĐŚƚĞƌŚƵŝƐ 
2001), that questions of technique are seldom only technical, but bear upon wider practical, 
philosophical, ethical and spiritual matters. 
Education tends to draw its conception of technological change from the prevailing cultural milieu. 
Consequently, education is given to stories of the transformative power of technology in education 
(Plowman and McPake 2013). The promise that digital education will revolutionise teaching and 
learning through, for example, the wide availability of digital learning resources or radically 
restructured virtual learning experiences, often passes without comment on the problematic social, 
ethical and epistemic assumptions underpinning such changes. ŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů  ‘ĨƵƚƵƌĞ
ƐŚŽĐŬ ?  W from dŽĨĨůĞƌ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨĚŝƐŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂůŝĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂƐĂƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŽĨĞǆĐĞƐƐŝǀĞƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚ
technological change (Toffler 1970) ƚŽ<ĂƉůĂŶ ?Ɛ ideas around the obsolescence of human intellectual 
labour (Kaplan 2015)  W have not suppressed our appetite for progress. Indeed education seems 
wedded to conceptions of social and individual (if not quite technological) progress that often go 
unexamined.  
While digital devices have long since become embedded in contemporary life, our social, cultural 
and particularly our educational institutions are struggling to keep up with the pace of change. This 
suggests a separation between what we can do with technology, and how we understand our 
enlarged capacities within the lifeworld of our institutions; it suggests what Günther Anders once 
called a discrepancy between production and conception ǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ ‘ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĞƐƚŚĂƚŝŶĂƚĞƌƌŝďůĞ sense we 
 ‘ŬŶŽǁŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌǁŚĂƚǁĞĚŽ ? ? ?(Lewin 2010). That we know not what we do was of great concern to 
Anders in 1957 with the emergence of the Cold War and the nuclear arms race. But perhaps the 
disproportion between action and conception is of greater significance still to present educational 
contexts. Failing to understand the implications our own actions is a concern, but embedding that 
blindness, making that blindness a structural feature of inattentive and procedurally focused 
systems of education, threatens to reinforce and extend that myopia.  
While virtual learning environments, MOOCs and the like are generating a great deal of interest, it is 
less clear that they are provoking sufficient pedagogical and philosophical reflection (Boyatt et al 
2014, University of Edinburgh MSc in E-learning 2011). This is partly because of the widely held 
assumption that technologies are tools, fundamentally neutral with respect to the purposes for 
which they are developed or to which they are applied. Tools, so it is assumed, do not in themselves 
imply a set of commitments, values or any particular way of being. Problematizing this assumption, 
the papers in this collection address a range of devices, platforms and affordances which stand 
poised to colonize the educational space. These include the massive open online course (Knox 2016), 
mobile internet associated technologies such as tablets and smartphones (Davies 2016) which are 
now ubiquitous in classrooms, and learning analytics software (Lundie 2016) which promises to 
measure educational outcomes and efficacies with ever increasing granularity. 
The philosopher who has done more than most to disabuse us from this instrumental conception of 
technology is Martin Heidegger whose influence can be detected directly or indirectly (through 
Derrida, Stielger and others) among the authors of these articles. While ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌ work did 
much to inaugurate the philosophy of technology as a sub-discipline of philosophy, there is no 
straightforward alignment here with his views, or indeed with any school or tradition among the 
authors of this issue. Although many philosophers have extended ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛ analysis of technology, 
disputing the presumed ideological neutrality of technology (Ellul 1964; Green 2002; Lewin 2012), 
the presumption of technological neutrality remains commonplace: many legal and pedagogical 
innovations still presuming technology to be ethically neutral (Alder 1998; Green 2002). Recent 
developments in the philosophy of information and computing, however, have begun to 
acknowledge the importance of philosophical reflection at the design level (Lewin 2013, Lundie 
2015, Wicker & Schrader 2010) although the application of these directions to philosophies of 
education remains nascent.  
Of course, even techno-optimists acknowledge that there may be problems with the impact of 
certain specific technologies and that precautionary approaches offer a corrective to over-zealous 
utopianism. Here it is assumed that there is no question concerning technology in principle, only in 
specific contexts. Where technology in principle does become questionable, it is too often vilified as 
hubristic, deterministic or nihilistic. A generalised suspicion of technology is as unhelpful as the 
thoughtless assumption that technology is unequivocally good. This kind of polarisation is reinforced 
by a settled range of binaries: the natural against the artificial; the organic against the synthetic; the 
discovered against the invented. The polarisation restricts sustained reflection on the complex and 
often ambivalent nature of technological change. Now more than ever such sustained reflection is 
needed. 
The work of Bernard Stiegler is pertinent here. His rise to prominence within Continental philosophy 
and philosophy of technology results from his sustained and creative engagement with his 
ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůĨŽƌĞďĞĂƌƐ ?ĨŝŐƵƌĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ,ƵƐƐĞƌů ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?^ŝŵŽŶĚŽŶĂŶĚĞůĞƵǌĞ ?^ƚŝĞŐůĞƌ ?Ɛ
work came to particular prominence ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚĞ  ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ ĞĂƌůǇ  ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ through his 3-volume 
Technics and Time. More recently Stiegler has applied his insights to education in varied ways: as a 
wider philosophical conception of civic and political engagement, of individual and social formation 
 ?ǁŚĂƚ^ƚŝĞŐůĞƌĐĂůůƐ ‘ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? as well as a concern for intellectual and cognitive development, 
and the impact of digital cultures on that development (Stiegler 2012). This concern has a direct 
ďĞĂƌŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞĞĚƵĐĂƚŝǀĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨ ‘ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŽƌƚŚĞĐŽŵŝŶŐŝŶƚŽƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů
in society (Biesta 2005). Philosophers of education have begun to draw on this body of work (Bradley 
2015, Kouppanou 2015) and this special issue continues in that vein. In a thoughtful engagement 
ǁŝƚŚ ^ƚŝĞŐůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ƐƉĂĐĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŝŵĞ ? :Ğƌemy Knox (2016) contends that a liberal-modernist 
orthodoxy of the university is maintained and structured into the new temporal relations of higher 
learning in the MOOC. Such preservation of cultural memory, Lewin (2016) argues, is a necessary 
prerequisite to culture, indeed in Stiegler (1998) to hominization, and is coeval with technologies of 
memory. Drawing on a Hegelian, rather than a Heideggerian conception of time, Lundie (2016) goes 
on to problematize the relational element of subjectification or self-becoming in digitally mediated 
pedagogies, while Bojesen (2016) highlights the importance of temporality to investigating whether 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ďǇ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ŝƐĂŶƵŶŝƋƵĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŽƌĂĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝƐƚŝĐ
prescription. 
/Ĩ^ƚŝĞŐůĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĞŶŐĂŐĞƐƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐŝŶ this collection in considering subjectification, then the work 
of Luciano Floridi urges us to consider the conceptual apparatus used to frame the essential ground 
of the subject ?&ůŽƌŝĚŝ ?ƐǁŽƌŬproblematizes the distinction between human and artificial intelligence, 
proffering ĂĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐŵƐ ? ?Floridi 2013) such that both may be the subject 
of a common ontological and ethical framework. Beginning at the level of abstraction of data and its 
basic definitions in information theory, Lundie (2016) challenges this characterisation, setting up a 
fundamental incompatibility between the information processor and the educational subject on the 
basis that ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ůĞĨƚ ƵŶĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚĂƚĂ ? ŝƚ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ? ŽũĞƐĞŶ ŽĨĨĞƌƐ Ă ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ
ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚŝƐƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ&ůŽƌŝĚŝ ?ƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶƚŽůŽŐǇŝŵƉůŝĞƐĂŶ ‘ŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŶŐŽƌ
ƉƌĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĨŝĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƵŶŝƚǇ ? ƚŽ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐŵƐ  W both human and artificial (Bojesen 
2016; Floridi 2011a). Beginning instead from the human end of the interaction, Davies (2016) draws 
ƵƉŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ  ‘ƚĞĐŚŶŽďŝŽƉŚŝůŝĂ ?  ?dŚŽŵĂƐ  ? ? ? ? ? ƚŽĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĂů ŝƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ůĂƚĞŶƚ ŝŶ
ŽƵƌ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ? ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐ ďŝĂƐ ďŽƚŚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐŝŐŶ ĂŶĚ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ĐůŽƵĚ ?
ƐƚƌĞĂŵ ? ?ĂŶĚ the landscape of ?ĐǇďĞƌƐƉĂĐĞ ? ?ĂǀŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Despite the interest in digital cultures, reports of the impending death of the traditional classroom 
have been greatly exaggerated. Alongside a suspicion of the long-term impacts of networked living  
(Richtel 2011, Stiegler 2010), wider concerns about the impact of digitisation on educational 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐĂƌĞďĞŝŶŐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚ ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨDKK ?ƐŽŶ ‘ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů
ůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ ? (a phantastical phrase likely referring to a non-existent origin) in higher education, Jan 
Masschelein and Maarten Simons (2013, Introduction), for example, have speculated that modern 
technologies threaten the institution of schooling as such since networked learning transfers most 
aspects of teaching and learning to the hands of the learners, thereby eroding the role of the 
teacher. This concern is related to the critical analysis of discourses of learning where constructivist 
learning paradigms seem to privilege the role of learning at the expense of teaching (Biesta 2006). 
Tendencies towards overstatement are strong: online learning cultures foretell the end of schooling; 
the end of the university is nigh. This special issue will frustrate all such simplistic narratives, drawing 
the reader into the complex and creative ambivalences that portray more faithfully the experience 
of practitioners: educators, students, technologists and philosophers. 
The issue opens with an interview with Bernard Stiegler in which the significance of digital culture 
for the formative and transitional phases of childhood is discussed. In her questioning, Kouppanou 
draws out the anthropological and ontological issues that are encountered when digital culture is 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ŝŶ ^ƚŝĞŐůĞƌ ?Ɛ ƚĞƌŵƐ ? dŚĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ĐůĞĂƌůǇ ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĞ ĚŝǀĞƌŐĞnce of StiĞŐůĞƌ ?Ɛ
thinking from Heidegger. It then moves on to consider the nature of learning as individuation and 
the role of teaching, and the different ways in which young people enter into culture in the digital 
age. Despite the deep concerns that are evident here, the discussion ends on an optimistic note 
whereby necessity is invoked as the agent of both formation and transformation. 
>ĞǁŝŶ ?Ɛ ĂƌƚŝĐůe seeks to question the often unconscious polarisations between the natural and 
artificial than exist within educational theories and practices. Drawing on Stiegler ?Ɛ analyses of 
memory and attention, Lewin explores what kinds of inattention modern technological culture 
encourages. He argues that attention has a capacity to mitigate some of the more excessive and 
pathological aspects of modern technology, and suggests that philosophers of religion might offer 
distinctive insights into the nature of attention and how technologies might form or disrupt it. 
Bojesen is similarly interested in the formative power of modern technologies. Inspired by Derrida 
and Stiegler, Bojesen ?Ɛ ƉĂƉĞƌ is concerned with the formation of the subject in the digital age in 
which, he argues, that our educational subjectivity has always been technological. Rather than 
offering a new definition of subjectivity for the digital age, Bojesen shows why definitions of 
subjectivity are themselves always already constrained by the technology of language itself, and 
seeks instead a reinvention rather than a prescription of subjectivity. >ƵŶĚŝĞ ?ƐƉaper problematizes 
information theoretic conceptions of knowledge transmission, arguing for the need to understand 
the impact of technological structures on the way learners value the learning experience. Returning 
again to the theme of the subject, Lundie argues that the complex ambivalence of the discussion 
tends to be elided by mindless techno-utopianism on the one hand, or reactionary techno-
scepticism on the other, resulting in a neglect of the human intersubjectivity of pedagogy. In 
reflecting on the use of mobile technologies in the classroom, Richard Davies ? paper foregrounds the 
relational nature of communication in contemporary internet-associated technologies, arguing for a 
more detailed consideration of the affordances for frequent small scale social interactions in online 
learning. Between the levels of abstraction (Floridi 2011b) of information theory explored by Lundie 
and of user interface explored by Davies, distinct and at times contrary conclusions can be drawn 
about the potential of digital interactions for humanizing pedagogy. Finally, problematizing the focus 
on the human subject of many of the foregoing papers, Knox draws upon critical posthumanism to 
ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞ ĂŶ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŶŽƚ ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ďƵƚ ŽĨ  ‘ŝŶƚƌĂ-ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ Śuman 
participants and web algorithms (Knox 2014). This conception rejects an instrumental view of 
technologies, helping to locate the posthuman subject both in embodied and virtual space. What is 
clear across this range of perspectives is the growing imperative of responsibility that demands that 
we take seriously the fact that, in the digital age the scale and scope of our actions have far greater 
capacity than they did for previous generations (Jonas 1984). Educational ideas can now go viral in 
ways that could hardly have been predicted. 
With the emergence of MOOCs and continued impact of technology on educational culture, this 
issue represents a timely and much-needed reflective space upon the continual changes we see in 
the world around us. The distinct levels at which digital technologies may be examined  W from the 
binary prima materia of data, up through algorithms and software platforms, to the socio-material 
impacts of technology in the classroom and wider society  W suggest a research agenda for the future 
which brings together technical, normative and pedagogical sensitivities to address the uniquely 
human phenomenon of pedagogy. 
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